Two important forces in human behavior are action and inaction. Although action and inaction are commonly associated with the presence and the absence of behavioral activity, they can also be represented as information processing goals. Action (inaction) goals influence decision effort and increase satisfaction with environments that are structured to allow for more (less) processing (Studies 1 and 2). This increased satisfaction can transfer to the decision (Study 3) and can increase the intent to perform a decision-congruent behavior (Studies 4 and 6) . Finally, the author shows escalation of action and inaction goals when they are not achieved (Study 5) and rebound of the alternative goal when the focal goal is achieved (Study 6).
Levels of activity in the population seem to ever increase. According to the latest Sleep in America poll of the National Science Foundation (2008) , one third of the population works at least 10 hr per day in the office, and Americans only get an average of 6 hr and 40 min of sleep each night. Yet, this intense activity may cause inactivity in other areas. For example, 20% of the population indicates a decrease in sexual activity or interest as a result of diminished hours of sleep (National Science Foundation, 2008) , and 74% of the population engages in insufficient or no physical activity in their free time (Hootman, Macera, Ham, Helmick, & Sniezek, 2003) . Moreover, although Eastern cultures place high value on the concept of patience and calmness in important pursuits, Western cultures place high value on a more active pace of life, which is often associated with greater achievement in important pursuits (Hofstede & Bond, 1988) .
Although researchers in psychology have extensively studied the operation of specific prime-to-behavior effects (Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007) , recent research has shown that general states of action and inaction can also be activated by primes (Albarracín et al., 2008) . The current research focuses on the operation of general action and inaction as information processing goals. Inaction goals are pursued through the performance of limited cognitive activity. Action goals are pursued through the performance of intense cognitive activity. When set in motion, action and inaction are associated with the concepts of behavioral activation and inhibition (Carver & White, 1994; Kruglanski et al., 2002) . I propose that the pursuit of an action goal encourages the operation of the behavioral activation system, which helps the individual reach increased levels of activity. The pursuit of an inaction goal encourages the operation of the behavioral inhibition system, which helps the individual reach decreased levels of activity. It is important to note that this activity can be both cognitive and physical. As defined in the Merriam-Webster (2009) dictionary, an activity represents "a process (as digestion) that an organism carries on or participates in by virtue of being alive" or "a similar process actually or potentially involving mental function." Congruent with this definition, Albarracín et al. (2008) demonstrated that priming action (vs. inaction) by exposing people to words such as action (vs. rest) increases (a) the likelihood that people will fold or doodle on a paper, (b) the amount of eating, (c) the recall of material presented in a book passage, and (d) the number of verbal and math problems solved. Albarracín et al. (2008) argued that these effects are mediated by goal activation but did not look at the consequences of goal pursuit. I provide additional insights into the operation of these goals by looking at the action and inaction goal pursuit process. More specifically, I look at the consequences of goal pursuit for postdecision affect and behavioral intentions. I predict that decision environments that allow for the pursuit and achievement of these information processing goals will generate increased satisfaction and increased likelihood that people will perform decision-congruent behaviors. This investigation offers important contributions. Little is known about the affective consequences of pursuing information processing goals. When people satisfy specific behavioral goals (e.g., eat a cake to satisfy a sweet craving), it is reasonable to believe that this process will generate positive affect. However, there is a lack of understanding of how processing goals are satisfied and what the consequences of this satisfaction are. In addition, researchers have long been interested in what determines people's satisfaction with their decisions (Wilson et al., 1993) and what determines the likelihood that these decisions will be followed by decision-congruent behaviors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1976) . The fact that the same decision can be construed as quite satisfying or dissatisfying requires the investigation of which factors can be used to increase people's satisfaction with their decisions and behaviors. Finally, the investigation of general action and inaction as a goal pursuit process allows us to differentiate these goals from an action mindset (Gollwitzer, 1990) . According to Gollwitzer (1990, p. 66) , an action mindset facilitates the pursuit and achievement of a goal, for it is "cognitive tuning toward internal and external cues that guide the course of action toward goal attainment." Whereas an action goal is a general goal that can be achieved through many behaviors, an action mindset represents cognitive activity aimed at finding ways to achieve a previously defined goal. Whereas an action goal is the goal itself, an action mindset is a phase in the pursuit of activated goals.
Behavioral Goals
Behavioral goals are desired end states associated with certain behaviors or means to goal achievement . Decades of research on behavioral goals have uncovered four important properties of these goals. First, means (i.e., behaviors) associated with the pursuit of behavioral goals can be positively associated with a goal, negatively associated with a goal, or neutral Markman & Brendl, 2005) . For example, when a healthy-eating behavioral goal is active, eating healthy food is positively associated with the goal, and eating fatty food is negatively associated with the goal. Other means, such as resting or watching TV, are neutral to the healthy-eating goal pursuit. The implication is that the activation of a goal concurrently activates means that are positively associated with these goals. Second, pursuit of behavioral goals is associated with increased positive affect. Custer and have shown that people work harder on tasks that are instrumental in achieving activated goals when these goals are linked to positive affective properties. Fishbach and Labroo (2007) have shown that people who are in a positive mood are more likely to pursue an accessible goal. The implication is that behavioral goals are usually not pursued if goal pursuit does not lead to positive affect.
Third, a behavioral goal that is not pursued may become stronger overtime. Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trotschel (2001) showed increased effects of a goal prime as the amount of time since the priming episode increases without pursuit and achievement of the goal. This property differentiates goals from purely cognitive primes, which have been shown to decrease in strength overtime (Higgins, 1996) . The implication is that the goal system scans the environment for an opportunity to achieve an activated goal until the proper means can be found (Laran, Janiszewski, & Cunha, 2008) . Fourth, the achievement of behavioral goals results in reduction of goal-directed activity. Means that are positively associated with a goal are more positively evaluated than are neutral means after goal priming, but not after goal achievement (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) . People are more likely to go out with friends at night than to perform a neutral activity (e.g., staying home) after they develop a sense of completion on their academic achievement goal by having studied all day (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005) . The implication is that the achievement of a behavioral goal may lead to goal disengagement (i.e., cessation of focal goal pursuit) or the pursuit of competing goals (i.e., previously competing goals become focal).
The theoretical reasoning and predictions of this research are based on the premise that exposure to action-and inaction-related stimuli trigger an information processing goal pursuit process. As such, action and inaction should share many of the characteristics associated with behavioral goals. I now discuss information processing goals and offer unique insights into the action and inaction goal pursuit process.
Information Processing Goals
Information processing goals differ from behavioral goals in that they are not associated with specific behaviors but rather are associated with the way people process information when making a decision. Processing goals have been shown to affect information distortion (Russo, Carlson, Meloy, & Yong, 2008) , the likelihood that evaluative conditioning will take place (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & Mussweiler, 2009) , and the reasons people use to justify their decisions (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993) . I now look at the four properties of behavioral goals discussed above in the context of action and inaction information processing goals. First, the means to achieve information processing goals are decision processes, not specific behaviors. An individual primed with an information processing goal will look for decision environments that are appropriate for the execution of associated decision processes. In the case of action (inaction) processing goals, the individual will look for decision environments that require a large (small) amount of information processing. Second, information processing goal pursuit should be associated with positive affect. Despite the fact that the means to an information processing goal achievement (i.e., decision processes) are not tactile behaviors (e.g., eat a tasty cake), I reason that information processing goals will only be pursued if the means to goal achievement are associated with positive affect . Therefore, decision environments that allow for the proper pursuit and achievement of an action or inaction goal will generate more positive affect toward the decision-making process than will those environments that do not allow for proper goal pursuit.
Third, the absence of goal achievement should make the pursuit of an active information processing goal, when the opportunity arises, more accentuated (i.e., the goal should become stronger). Although escalation of behavioral goal priming effects have been shown before (Bargh et al., 2001; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008) , no researcher has investigated whether information processing goals escalate over time and whether escalation will impact postdecision affect. Affect resulting from the pursuit of a stronger goal may be the same as that resulting from the pursuit of a weaker goal (i.e., before temporal escalation). Alternatively, as a goal escalates, it may be the case that the opportunity of properly pursuing this goal generates more positive affect than does the pursuit of a weaker goal. This investigation sheds light on the affective properties associated with the pursuit of processing goals of varied strengths.
Fourth, achievement of information processing goals may result in pursuit of competing goals. To understand what happens after the achievement of an action or inaction processing goal, one has to look into the nature of these goals. A long Sunday of rest is often followed by an intense Monday at work. Long hours of sleep are often followed by long hours of activity. People alternate between states of action and states of inaction because both states are important to the appropriate functioning of people's minds and bodies. Theorizing assumes an important role for activation and inhibition in this process. According to , a focal goal pursuit is only possible when intervening tasks (i.e., tasks that are also important but not instrumental to the pursuit of a currently active goal) are inhibited. Goal shielding theory demonstrates that the activation of goals that are important to people (e.g., being intelligent) results in decreased accessibility of goals that may interfere with the activated goal (e.g., being fit; . The pursuit of an action (inaction) goal should lead to inhibition of information associated with inaction (action) because inaction (action) is also important to an individual's behavioral system. Thus, achievement of one goal should lead to release of this goal and pursuit of the previously inhibited goal, rather than the absence of goal pursuit. This prediction finds support in previous research. For example, people activate inhibited stereotypes to a larger extent than does a control group after they have completed a stereotype inhibition task (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994) . People show increased desire for fatty food over healthy food right after they perceive they have completed a healthy-eating goal by avoiding fatty food (Laran & Janiszewski, 2009) . Indeed, there may be advantages to pursuing competing goals once a focal goal has been achieved. Because the single-minded pursuit of a single goal would be unhealthy, people may reach balance in their lives by activating previously inhibited goals once the focal goal pursuit process is completed.
Given the focus on the goal pursuit process, it is important to specify what constitutes goal pursuit and achievement when an inaction goal is activated. If exposure to general action and inaction concepts activates the goals associated with these concepts, the definition of ways in which these goals can be achieved has to allow a little more flexibility than originally described by Albarracín et al. (2008) . These authors define inaction as a lack of action. If one thinks about action and inaction as two ends of a continuum (i.e., total inaction-total action), a lack of flexibility may signify that these states can never be achieved as goals. How can any living system achieve states of absolute action or inaction? Although the activity continuum ranges from no activity to intense activity, the activation of action and inaction goals moves individuals in a certain direction in the continuum, not necessarily to the very end. These goals can be pursued and achieved by passing a threshold in the activity continuum. It seems implausible that a living being would be able to reach a level of complete inactivity, even when sleeping (i.e., physiological and mental activities are still in process). As an example, think about how these goals are pursued in people's daily lives. Many times people are required to make decisions when they are not willing to at the moment (i.e., an inaction goal is activated). One may need to decide where to meet friends for lunch even though she does not want to eat at the moment. One may need to give advice to a friend on a pressing decision even though she would rather refrain from giving advice. In these situations, it is likely that an inaction goal will remain active, but the goal will be pursued through the execution of limited cognitive activity (e.g., evaluation of few pieces of information).
Overview of Studies
I conducted six studies in order to test my predictions. In Study 1, I test whether the priming of an action (vs. inaction) goal influences decision process satisfaction when a set of alternatives offers a large (vs. small) amount of information about each alternative. In Study 2, I test whether these primes influence process measures, such as the amount of information that people choose to process, and decision time. In the next two studies, I test whether the affect from pursuing the goal is transferred to the chosen alternative (Study 3) and increase the estimated likelihood of performing a decision-congruent behavior (Study 4). In the final two studies, I test the goal properties of general action and inaction primes. In Study 5, I examine whether action and inaction goals become stronger overtime (i.e., temporal escalation) and whether goal strength generates increased affect toward the goal pursuit process. In Study 6, I examine whether the release of an action (inaction) goal after goal achievement results in the subsequent activation of a competing inaction (action) goal.
Study 1: Action and Inaction Goal Primes and Decision Process Satisfaction
In Study 1, I look at the affective consequences of the action and inaction goal pursuit process. The objective in Study 1 is to provide evidence that a primed information processing goal may influence affect toward the decision-making process, depending on whether the decision environment is conducive to the pursuit and achievement of this goal. I contend that the priming of general action and inaction goals can influence the amount of information about a set of alternatives that people are willing to process. When the amount of information in the decision environment is conducive to goal pursuit and achievement, people should have increased affect toward the decision-making process. To test this prediction, I primed one of two goals and asked participants to make a choice among brands of digital cameras. I then varied the amount of information about each alternative available in the set and measured people's satisfaction with the decision-making process.
Method
Participants and design. Three hundred and ninety-three undergraduate students participated in the experiment for extra credit. The design was a 2 (information load: high vs. low) ϫ 3 (goal prime: action vs. inaction vs. neutral) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimuli. Participants were welcomed to the behavioral lab and were seated in front of personal computers. The procedure involved two phases, supposedly unrelated studies. The first study was the goal priming task. Participants were told that they would now participate in a recall task for investigating which information is more memorable to people. They were shown 10 sentences, in random order, for 2 s each. This procedure was repeated three times. At the end of the presentation, participants were asked to type the one sentence that was most memorable to them. In the action goal prime condition, I presented participants with sentences such as "Just Do It," "It's Time to Fly," and "Victory Won't Wait for the Nation That's Late." In the inaction goal prime condition, I presented participants with sentences such as "The Pause That Refreshes," "Slow Down to Get Around," and "You Deserve a Break Today." In the control, neutral goal prime condition, I presented participants with sentences such as "Skim Milk Does not Come From Skinny Cows," "It's Not a Dream. It's Real," and "We Got It All."
Participants were told that they were done with the recall task and then were moved to the second study, a product choice study. They were presented with three brands of digital cameras identified by letters (i.e., Brand A, Brand B, and Brand C) and information about their attributes, which were all alignable attributes. In the high load condition, I presented information about nine attributes, whereas in the low load condition I presented information about four attributes (see the Appendix). After choosing one of the alternatives, participants were told that they were now going to be asked a series of questions about the process of choosing one of the digital cameras. Nine questions were filler questions and one question (presented in random order) was central to the objectives of the study, that is, how satisfied participants were with the process of choosing a digital camera (1 ϭ not satisfied at all, 9 ϭ very satisfied). Participants were then debriefed and dismissed. Funneled debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) indicated that no participant guessed the real purposed of the study.
Pretest. Before testing my predictions, it was important to determine whether the sentences related to action and inaction were activating the concepts associated with action and inaction goals. Two hundred and seventy-seven students participated in the pretest. The design was a 2 (goal prime: action vs. inaction) ϫ 2 (word type: action vs. inaction) mixed design. The goal prime factor was manipulated between-subjects, whereas the word type factor was manipulated within-subjects. The procedure consisted of two tasks. The goal prime task was the same as that of the main experiment. Participants were then told that they were done with the recall task and that they would now participate in an attention task. I told participants to focus their attention on a fixation point (an X) on the center of the computer screen. The fixation point disappeared in an interval varying between 0 s and 2 s (randomly determined) and was replaced by a letter string. Participants were instructed to make a decision as quickly and accurately as possible, to press 1 if the letter string was a word, and to press 0 if it was not. After 10 practice trials, participants responded to 10 words related to action (e.g., motion, energy, speed), 10 words related to inaction (e.g., sleep, peace, stop), and nonwords (e.g., pseeg, naupps, prerge). I measured the time it took participants to press the appropriate key.
Only reaction times that involved correct identifications of a letter string as a word and that did not exceed three standard deviations from the cell mean after being log transformed (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fazio, 1990) were included in the analysis. Reaction times were averaged to generate one score for each type of word for each participant. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction of word type and goal prime, F(1, 273) ϭ 5.15, p Ͻ .01. There was an effect of goal prime on the accessibility of the action goal concept. Participants were faster to identify words related to action in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 615 ms, SE ϭ 161.18) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 663 ms, SE ϭ 181.43), F(1, 273) ϭ 3.91, p Ͻ .05. There was an effect of goal prime on the accessibility of the inaction goal concept. Participants were faster to identify words related to inaction in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 625 ms, SE ϭ 132.24) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 664 ms, SE ϭ 120.08), F(1, 273) ϭ 4.64, p Ͻ .05.
Results and Discussion
An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between information load and goal prime, F(2, 387) ϭ 23.26, p Ͻ .01 (Figure 1 ). In the high information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.30, SE ϭ 0.25) than were participants in the control, neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.46, SE ϭ 0.19), F(1, 387) ϭ 7.04, p Ͻ .01, but were less satisfied with the decision process in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.84, SE ϭ 0.17) than in the control, neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.46, SE ϭ 0.19), F(1, 387) ϭ 5.76, p Ͻ .05. In the low information load condition, participants were less satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.64, SE ϭ 0.19) than in the control, neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.28, SE ϭ 0.16), F(1, 387) ϭ 6.55, p ϭ .01, but more satisfied with the decision process in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.83, SE ϭ 0.15) than in the control, neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.28, SE ϭ 0.16),
These results demonstrate how offering individuals an opportunity to pursue an information processing goal can influence affect toward the decision-making process. When the set of alternatives was appropriate for goal pursuit and achievement (e.g., high information load after an action goal prime), people indicated that they were more satisfied with the decision-making process than when the set of options was not appropriate for goal pursuit and achievement (e.g., high information load after an inaction goal prime).
1 Study 2 provides processing evidence that these goals were being pursued during the decision-making process.
Study 2: Influence on Processing
In Study 2, I examine the processing consequences of action and inaction goal primes. I propose that satisfaction with the decision 1 Although funneled debriefing indicated that no participant guessed the real purpose of the study, self-reports are not the best way to investigate whether participants were simply guessing the study hypothesis and being compliant. It may have been the case that participants represented the sentences shown in the first task as instructions about how much information they should process and used this representation to process information in the second task. To investigate this issue, I used this pretest to replace the priming task with instructions to process a large amount of information (action condition), versus a small amount of information (inaction condition), to make a decision. There was not an interaction between information load and goal instructions in this pretest (F Ͻ 1). Participants were equally satisfied with the decision process in the high information load condition (action, M ϭ 6.61, SE ϭ 0.29 vs. inaction, M ϭ 6.76, SE ϭ 0.28; F Ͻ 1). Participants were equally satisfied with the decision process in the low information load condition (action, M ϭ 6.40, SE ϭ 0.28 vs. inaction, M ϭ 6.82, SE ϭ 0.27) F(1, 205) ϭ 1.19, p Ͼ .27. These results attest that participants did not interpret the priming task as simply instructions to process a certain amount of information. process in Study 1 was the result of differences in people's willingness to process information. If that is the case, participants in the action goal prime condition should indicate a willingness to process more pieces of information and spend more time processing information than do participants in the inaction goal prime condition.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and thirty-nine undergraduate students participated in the experiment for extra credit. The design was a 2 (information load: high vs. low) ϫ 2 (goal prime: action vs. inaction) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimuli. The procedure and stimuli were the same as those of Study 1, with two exceptions. After the priming task, participants were told that the next task involved choosing digital cameras on the basis of their attributes and were asked whether they wanted to look at a few or at many attributes about each camera (binary question). I also measured the time it took each participant to choose a camera.
Results
Willingness to process information and processing times. Significantly more participants in the action prime condition (M ϭ 60.0%) than in the inaction prime condition (M ϭ 24.6%) indicated that they wanted to see information about many attributes, 2 (1, N ϭ 139) ϭ 17.79, p Ͻ .01. An ANOVA revealed a main effect of information load when processing times were analyzed. Participants were slower to make a choice in the high information load condition (M ϭ 30.26 s, SE ϭ 1.83) than in the low information load condition (M ϭ 20.05 s, SE ϭ 1.69), F(1, 135) ϭ 16.35, p Ͻ .01. The main question, however, was whether goal prime influenced processing times. Participants in the action prime condition took significantly more time to make a decision (M ϭ 28.87 s, SE ϭ 1.75) than did participants in the inaction prime condition (M ϭ 21.44 s, SE ϭ 1.77), F(1, 135) ϭ 8.93, p Ͻ .01. There was no interaction between goal prime and information load,
Decision process satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between information load and goal prime, F(1, 135) ϭ 15.48, p Ͻ .01. In the high information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.94, SE ϭ 0.27) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.90, SE ϭ 0.28), F(1, 135) ϭ 7.31, p Ͻ .01. In the low information load condition, participants were less satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.41, SE ϭ 0.25) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.42, SE ϭ 0.25), F(1, 135) ϭ 8.24, p Ͻ .01.
Discussion
Study 2 provides evidence for the activation of action and inaction goals by showing that priming of these goals influences willingness to process information and the time it takes people to make a decision. People primed with action (vs. inaction) were more willing to evaluate many pieces of information about the alternatives and spent more time making a decision both when the alternative set offered few pieces of information and when the alternative set offered many pieces of information.
Study 3: Transfer of Affect in the Goal System
In Study 3, I investigate the extent to which the affect generated toward the decision-making process is transferred to the actual decision participants make (i.e., a chosen option). I contend that satisfaction with one's decision will depend on the extent to which the decision environment enables the pursuit of a primed information processing goal. To test this prediction, I measure satisfaction with a chosen alternative and test the mediating effect of satisfaction with the decision process.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and thirteen students participated in the experiment for extra credit. The design was a 2 (information load: high vs. low) ϫ 2 (goal prime: action vs. inaction) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimuli. The procedure and stimuli were the same as those of Study 1. All conditions in the study had an additional dependent measure: Participants were asked how satisfied they were with the alternative they chose (1 ϭ not satisfied at all, 9 ϭ very satisfied). This question was added in random order along with 9 additional filler questions presented after the first set of 10 questions was asked.
Results
Decision process satisfaction and satisfaction with a chosen alternative. An ANOVA on the decision process satisfaction measure revealed a significant interaction between information load and goal prime, F(1, 109) ϭ 23.21, p Ͻ .01 (Figure 2A ). In the high information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.65, SE ϭ 0.23) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.91, SE ϭ 0.30), F(1, 109) ϭ 3.99, p Ͻ .05. In the low information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.04, SE ϭ 0.26) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.26, SE ϭ 0.26), F(1, 109) ϭ 23.36, p Ͻ .01.
An ANOVA on the chosen alternative satisfaction measure revealed a significant interaction between information load and goal prime, F(1, 109) ϭ 14.35, p Ͻ .01 ( Figure 2B ). In the high information load condition, participants were more satisfied with their chosen alternative in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.05, SE ϭ 0.18) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.43, SE ϭ 0.24), F(1, 109) ϭ 4.41, p Ͻ .05. In the low information load condition, participants were more satisfied with their chosen alternative in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.07, SE ϭ 0.21) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.11, SE ϭ 0.21), F(1, 109) ϭ 10.67, p Ͻ .01.
Mediation analysis. I conducted a mediation analysis to examine to which degree choice satisfaction was predicted by decision process satisfaction (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . The interaction of information load and goal prime predicts both decision process satisfaction (␤ ϭ 2.52), F(1, 112) ϭ 9.35, p Ͻ .01, and choice satisfaction (␤ ϭ 1.59), F(1, 112) ϭ 5.44, p Ͻ .01. Decision process satisfaction predicts choice satisfaction (␤ ϭ .51), F(1, 112) ϭ 9.42, p Ͻ .01. However, when both decision process satisfaction and interaction are used as predictors of choice satisfaction, decision process satisfaction remains significant (␤ ϭ .51), F(2, 111) ϭ 9.37, p Ͻ .01, whereas the interaction becomes nonsignificant (␤ ϭ .05, p ϭ .30). A Sobel test confirmed that the mediation was significant (Z ϭ 3.51, p Ͻ .01). This is evidence that the effect of the interaction of information load and goal prime on choice satisfaction is fully mediated by satisfaction with the decision process.
Discussion
Study 3 offers evidence for the proposed affective transfer in unconscious goal pursuit. When the decision environment was conducive to goal pursuit and achievement, the increased satisfaction with the decision process was transferred to the decision itself. One concern, however, is that participants might have simply been willing to show consistency and, thus, gave similar responses to the satisfaction with the decision process and satisfaction with a chosen alternative measures. Study 4 alleviates these concerns by eliminating any measure that could have triggered consistency seeking.
Study 4: Affect and Subsequent Behavioral Intentions
In Study 4, I investigate charity donation behavior in order to investigate how allowing people to achieve processing goals may influence their behavioral intentions. I hypothesize that matching the amount of information about an array of charities to an active action or inaction processing goal can ultimately influence the amount of money an individual is willing to donate to a chosen charity. This prediction stems from the affect resulting from the goal pursuit process. Because the decision process generates positive affect, this affect is used as a signal that the decisioncongruent behavior is the appropriate path to take. This proposition relies on findings indicating that an implicit association is formed between positive affect and approach tendency and negative affect and avoidance tendency. Fishbach and Labroo (2007) contended that positive affect signals people to approach a stimulus, whereas negative affect signals people to avoid a stimulus. For example, people who are in a positive mood are more likely to pursue an accessible goal (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007) .
In addition, one could argue that the measurement of decision process satisfaction in the previous experiment influenced judgments of decision satisfaction. For this reason and to increase realism in my procedure, I did not measure decision process satisfaction in this study.
Method
Participants and design. Three hundred and thirty-nine students participated in the experiment for extra credit. The design was a 2 (information load: high vs. low) ϫ 3 (goal prime: action vs. inaction vs. neutral) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimuli. The goal priming task replicated that of the previous experiments. After the task was over, participants were told that I was trying to get donations for some charities in the university region. They were asked whether they were interested in donating money to a local charity, and in case they were, they were asked to write down their e-mail address so the charity could contact them later in the week. Those who were not interested in donating money did not participate in the experiment (21.7% of the original participants in the action prime condition, 29.7% of participants in the inaction prime condition, and 25.0% of participants in the neutral condition). Participants were then exposed to information about three local charities, one helping people with physical disabilities, one helping children, and one helping the elderly. In the low load condition, I only presented one piece of information about each charity (e.g., "Assistance is provided in bathing, housekeeping, and emotional security"). In the high load condition, I presented six pieces of information about each charity, including the charities' websites and others (e.g., "Assistance is provided in bathing, housekeeping, and emotional security"; "Emergency Alert Response designed for the care of people who may be living alone"; "Provides care for people age 18ϩ with severe memory impairment"; "Therapeutic activities include physical exercise, active and quiet games"; "Offers congregate meal sites and home-delivered meals for seniors."). After participants chose the charity they wanted to donate money to, they indicated how much money they wanted to donate, which was my dependent measure. I told participants that they would be contacted by the charities later in the week, and no money was collected during the experimental session. Participants were then thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between information load and goal prime, F(2, 333) ϭ 27.44, p Ͻ .01 (Figure 3 ). In the high information load condition, participants were willing to donate more money in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ $139.40, SE ϭ 16.13) than in the neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ $84.35, SE ϭ 15.60), F(1, 333) ϭ 5.14, p Ͻ .05, but were willing to donate less money in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ $37.19, SE ϭ 12.30) than in the neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ $84.35, SE ϭ 15.60), F(1, 333) ϭ 6.82, p ϭ .01. In the low information load condition, participants were willing to donate less money in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ $27.11, SE ϭ 14.01) than in the neutral goal prime condition (M ϭ $78.19, SE ϭ 15.27), F(1, 333) ϭ 5.66, p Ͻ .05, but were willing to donate more money in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ $129.16, SE ϭ 12.56) than in the neutral goal prime condition, (M ϭ $78.19, SE ϭ 0.24), F(1, 333) ϭ 6.79, p ϭ .01.
These results provide additional evidence of how the positive affect resulting from information processing goal pursuit can influence behavior. Although affect toward the decision-making process was not measured in this study to eliminate alternative explanations based on consistency seeking, it is apparent that an appropriate decision environment made people more satisfied with their choices of charities. This satisfaction made participants want to donate more money to the chosen charity.
Study 5: Temporal Escalation
Priming effects have been attributed to self-concept activation (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007) , habit activation (Sheeran et al., 2005) , and goal activation (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, & Tanner, 2008; Fitzsimons et al., 2008) , to name a few mechanisms. For instance, one could argue that sentences related to action simply prime a trait or behavior, such as "being an actionable person." In Study 5, I differentiate action and inaction goal activation from trait or behavior activation. As opposed to merely semantic activations such as behaviors or traits, an unachieved goal may become stronger overtime. Escalation is frequently used as a property that shows the motivational content of goals (Bargh et al., 2001; Fitzsimons et al., 2008) . This issue is important because of the general nature of action and inaction. When these goals are set in motion, is it the case that any behavior will be performed to achieve them? If this is true then these goals do not escalate over time but rather are achieved through any behavioral opportunity (i.e., any task). As time passes, people would find ways of achieving activity or inactivity and, thus, satisfy the currently activated goal, leaving room for competing goal activation. Alternatively, these goals may only be pursued and achieved when the appropriate opportunity is available (i.e., a task that requires intense or very little cognitive activity). If this is true, then these goals should show escalation over time as other goals do. As time passes, an unachieved goal will become stronger until the appropriate opportunity for goal achievement arises, and its effect on behavior will escalate. To eliminate concerns associated with the use of a supraliminal priming task in the previous studies, I used a subliminal priming technique in the initial task in this study.
Method
Participants and design. Two hundred and ninety-nine students participated in the experiment for extra credit. The design was a 2 (delay: control vs. delay) ϫ 2 (information load: high vs. low) ϫ 2 (goal prime: action vs. inaction) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimuli. The first task was aimed at priming a goal subliminally. Participants were told that I was interested in understanding people's ability to perform two tasks simultaneously. They were told that they would be shown sentences on the computer screen, similar to the previous studies, and that other stimuli would flash on the corners of the screen. Their task was to memorize the sentences and to indicate, as fast as accurately as possible, whether the other stimuli flashed on the left or the right side of the screen. The sentences presented on the center of the screen were the neutral sentences from Study 1. The priming words in the action goal prime condition were move, busy, action, and energy, and the priming words in the inaction goal prime condition were pause, rest, stop, and relax. These words were presented outside of participants' foveal visual field in one of the four quadrants of the screen, in randomized order, all equidistant from the fixation point at angles of 45°, 135°, 225°, and 315°. Chairs were placed approximately 90 cm away from the computer monitor, ensuring that the priming stimuli would fall in the parafoveal region of participants' visual fields. There were 12 practice trials and 36 experimental trials, for a total of 48 trials of subliminally primed words. As in the procedure of Chartrand and Bargh (1996) , each trial consisted of a stimulus flashed on the screen for 60 ms, followed by a 60 ms presentation of a string of random letters (XQFBZRMQWGBX) masking the priming words. Participants were told to focus their attention on the sentences on the center of the screen, to press 1 if the flash was on the left side of the screen, and to press 0 if it was on the right side.
After the priming task, participants in the delay condition were told that they would now perform a second study. I was especially careful in choosing the filler task for the study. One concern was that filler tasks commonly used as a delay task could be seen as an opportunity to achieve action and inaction goals. People could perform intense activity on a filler task when primed with an action goal. People could choose not to do anything on a filler task when primed with an inaction goal. I suspect that this would not be the case. Although specific activities can be used to achieve action and inaction goals, the reason why certain behaviors become goalachieving behaviors is that similar behaviors have been used in the past to achieve certain goals. For example, if an achievement goal is primed, people become more competitive because competition commonly helps people achieve more. The second study was supposedly aimed at understanding which words are most commonly used in the English language. Participants were told that they would be given 5 min to write down words that had the letter e, after which they would automatically be sent to the next screen with the final task. I chose this task because it required participants to perform an activity over the 5 min period, which would stop them from achieving an inaction goal, but at the same time, the task was not demanding enough to achieve an action processing goal. To keep things similar across all conditions, participants in the control, no delay condition performed this task as the first task of the experimental session. There were no significant differences in the amount of words written by participants in the different goal prime conditions (F Ͻ 1).
Results
Processing times. An ANOVA revealed a main effect of information load. Participants were slower to make a choice in the high information load condition (M ϭ 26.88 s, SE ϭ 1.19) than in the low information load condition (M ϭ 22.11 s, SE ϭ 0.98), F(1, 292) ϭ 9.60, p Ͻ .01. The main question was whether goal prime and delay influenced processing times. There was an interaction between delay and goal prime, F(1, 291) ϭ 9.19, p Ͻ .01. In the control condition, participants in the action prime condition took significantly more time to make a decision (M ϭ 26.64 s, SE ϭ 1.19) than did participants in the inaction prime condition (M ϭ 22.77, SE ϭ 1.38) F(1, 291) ϭ 4.50, p Ͻ .05. In the delay condition, participants in the action prime condition also took significantly more time to make a decision (M ϭ 30.89 s, SE ϭ 1.27) than did participants in the inaction prime condition (M ϭ 17.68, SE ϭ 2.13) F(1, 291) ϭ 28.31, p Ͻ .01. Moreover, participants in the action prime condition took more time to make a decision in the delay condition than in the control condition, F(1, 291) ϭ 5.96, p Ͻ .05, whereas participants in the inaction prime condition took less time to make a decision in the delay condition than in the control condition, F(1, 291) ϭ 4.00, p Ͻ .05.
Decision process satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction of delay, information load, and goal prime, F(1, 291) ϭ 6.74, p ϭ .01 (Figure 4 ). There was an interaction between delay and goal prime in the high information load condition, F(1, 291) ϭ 20.70, p Ͻ .01. In the no delay, control condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.69, SE ϭ 0.20) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.11, SE ϭ 0.21), F(1, 291) ϭ 3.95, p Ͻ .05. In the delay condition, participants were also more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.50, SE ϭ 0.26) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.00, SE ϭ 0.32), F(1, 291) ϭ 13.39, p Ͻ .01. Additional simple effects tests support the temporal-escalation property of a goal. In the action goal prime condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process after a delay than in the absence of a delay, F(1, 291) ϭ 6.23, p ϭ .01. There was no difference as a function of a delay in the inaction goal prime condition (F Ͻ 1).
There was also an interaction between delay and goal prime in the low information load condition, F(1, 291) ϭ 18.08, p Ͻ .01. In the no delay, control condition, participants were less satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.00, SE ϭ 0.20) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.62, SE ϭ 0.23), F(1, 291) ϭ 4.09, p Ͻ .05. In the delay condition, participants were also less satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.26, SE ϭ .20) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.74, SE ϭ 0.29), F(1, 291) ϭ 17.63, p Ͻ .01. Additional simple effects tests support the temporal-escalation property of a goal. In the inaction goal prime condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process after a delay than in the absence of a delay, F(1, 291) ϭ 9.06, p Ͻ .01. There was no difference as a function of a delay in the action goal prime condition (F Ͻ 1).
Discussion
Study 5 provides evidence for the goal activation process I propose by showing temporal escalation. Action and inaction goals became stronger after a delay and generated increased positive affect when pursued in an appropriate environment. This demonstration is important because it relates to how the goal system pursues general action and inaction goals. Not every behavior can be used to achieve these goals. Goal-achieving behaviors have to be behaviors that have been used in the past to achieve certain goals. Making a choice, a task used in all studies in this research, is something people do on a daily basis using different amounts of processing, which granted goal pursuit and increased postdecision affect.
Study 6: The Consequences of Goal Achievement for Subsequent Goal Pursuit
In Study 6, I provide an additional test of the goal properties of general action and inaction by examining the consequences of goal achievement. In Study 6, I allow some participants to achieve a primed goal by performing a goal-directed behavior before choosing a brand of digital camera. If a trait or behavior is being primed, performing the behavior should not impact subsequent satisfaction. For the reasons I discussed in the theoretical background, if a goal is being primed, performing a behavior related to that goal might lead to goal achievement and pursuit of competing goals, as has been found elsewhere (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007) . For example, performing an intense processing task after the prime of an action processing goal might lead to achievement of the action goal and pursuit of an inaction goal.
Method
Participants and design. Three hundred and one students participated in the experiment for extra credit. The design was a 2 (goal state: unachieved vs. achieved) ϫ 2 (information load: high vs. low) ϫ 2 (goal prime: action vs. inaction) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimuli. After the goal priming task, which replicated that of Experiment 1, participants were told that they would now clear their minds by focusing on a different task before advancing to the next experiment. Participants performed one of two tasks. One task was aimed at achieving an action processing goal and involved solving two Graduate Record Examination (GRE) problems: one math problem and one analogy problem. A second task was aimed at achieving an inaction processing goal; participants were asked to close their eyes for 2 min and try to relax. Half the participants performed the first task, and the other half performed the second task. Therefore, for those primed with an action goal, performing the first task (i.e., GRE problems) put them in the achieved goal state condition, whereas performing the second task (i.e., relaxation) put them in the unachieved goal state condition. For those primed with an inaction goal, performing the first task put them in the unachieved goal state condition, whereas performing the second task put them in the achieved goal state condition. After this task, all participants chose a brand of digital camera and answered questions about their decision process. This time I asked participants to indicate how likely they were to actually purchase the alternative that they chose (1 ϭ not likely at all, 9 ϭ very likely).
Pretest. I was concerned that simply performing the GRE and resting tasks could influence participants' evaluation of the decision process under different information loads. To address this issue, I had participants perform either the GRE or the resting task; in an ostensibly unrelated study, I had participants choose a brand of digital camera from either a high or a low information load set and indicate their satisfaction with the decision process. There was no effect of performing a task on satisfaction with the process under different information loads. When choosing from a high information load set, participants were equally satisfied with the decision process after having solved GRE problems (M ϭ 6.71, SE ϭ 0.24) and after having rested for 2 min (M ϭ 6.63, SE ϭ 0.26; F Ͻ 1). When choosing from a low information load set, participants were also equally satisfied with the decision process after having solved GRE problems (M ϭ 6.66, SE ϭ 0.25) and after having rested for 2 min (M ϭ 6.56, SE ϭ 0.24; F Ͻ 1).
Results
Decision process satisfaction. An ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction of goal state, information load, and goal prime, F(1, 293) ϭ 41.05, p Ͻ .01 ( Figure 5A ). There was an interaction between information load and goal prime in the unachieved goal state condition, F(1, 300) ϭ 17.81, p Ͻ .01. In the high information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.00, SE ϭ 0.25) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.89, SE ϭ 0.28), F(1, 293) ϭ 8.85, p Ͻ .01. In the low information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.20, SE ϭ 0 .29) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.03, SE ϭ 0.25), F(1, 293) ϭ 9.15, p Ͻ .01.
There was also an interaction between information load and goal prime in the achieved goal state condition, F(1, 300) ϭ 25.42, p Ͻ .01. However, results followed the opposite direction. In the high information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 7.20, SE ϭ 0.20) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.06, SE ϭ 0.25), F(1, 293) ϭ 12.87, p Ͻ .01. In the low information load condition, participants were more satisfied with the decision process in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.96, SE ϭ 0.20) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.92, SE ϭ 0.23), F(1, 293) ϭ 11.41, p Ͻ .01.
Estimated likelihood of performing a decision-congruent behavior. An ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction of goal state, information load, and goal prime, F(1, 293) ϭ 24.67, p Ͻ .01 ( Figure 5B ). There was an interaction between information load and goal prime in the unachieved goal state Figure 5 . The influence of action and inaction processing goal achievement and nonachievement on decision process satisfaction and estimated likelihood of performing a decision-congruent behavior in Study 6. condition, F(1, 300) ϭ 12.08, p Ͻ .01. In the high information load condition, participants indicated that they were more likely to purchase the brand they chose in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.29, SE ϭ 0.35) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.22, SE ϭ 0.40), F(1, 293) ϭ 3.96, p Ͻ .05. In the low information load condition, participants indicated that they were more likely to purchase the brand they chose in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.40, SE ϭ 0.42) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 4.85, SE ϭ 0.36), F(1, 293) ϭ 7.87, p Ͻ .01.
There was also an interaction between information load and goal prime in the achieved goal state condition, F(1, 300) ϭ 14.75, p Ͻ .01. However, results followed the opposite direction. In the high information load condition, participants indicated that they were more likely to purchase the brand they chose in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.35, SE ϭ 0.28) than in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 5.44, SE ϭ 0.36), F(1, 293) ϭ 3.95, p Ͻ .05. In the low information load condition, participants indicated that they were more likely to purchase the brand they chose in the action goal prime condition (M ϭ 6.38, SE ϭ 0.29) than in the inaction goal prime condition (M ϭ 4.95, SE ϭ 0.33), F(1, 293) ϭ 10.53, p Ͻ .01.
Mediation analysis. I conducted a mediation analysis to examine to which degree behavioral intention was predicted by decision process satisfaction (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . The interaction of goal state, information load, and goal prime predicts both decision process satisfaction (␤ ϭ .47), F(1, 300) ϭ 4.36, p Ͻ .01, and choice satisfaction (␤ ϭ .20), F(1, 300) ϭ 1.92, p ϭ .05. Decision process satisfaction predicts behavioral intention (␤ ϭ .67), F(1, 300) ϭ 21.48, p Ͻ .01. However, when both decision process satisfaction and interaction are used as predictors of behavioral intention, decision process satisfaction remains significant (␤ ϭ .68), F(2, 301) ϭ 21.39, p Ͻ .01, whereas the interaction becomes nonsignificant (␤ Ͻ .01, ns). A Sobel test confirmed that the mediation was significant (Z ϭ 1.92, p ϭ .05). This is evidence that the effect of the interaction on behavioral intention is fully mediated by the satisfaction with the decision process.
Discussion
Study 6 provides additional evidence for the goal activation process I propose. When the processing goal was primed and not achieved, people were more satisfied with the decision process when the decision environment afforded an opportunity for the pursuit and achievement of the primed goal. When there was an opportunity for goal achievement after the goal was primed and before decision making, people were more satisfied with the decision process when the decision environment afforded an opportunity for achievement of a competing goal. These results not only provide evidence for a goal pursuit process but also shed light on the issue of whether goal achievement moves the goal system to a resting state (i.e., null effect of goal primes after goal achievement) or triggers the pursuit of competing goals .
General Discussion
Previous research focused on the behavioral consequences of priming (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Dik, 2008; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh et al., 2001) . Typically, a certain information content is made active without individuals' awareness, which makes people more likely to perform behaviors congruent with the active information content. In the current article, I examine affect as a consequence of an information processing goal pursuit process and examine how this affect can influence subsequent behaviors. In this process, I was able to advance the understanding of (a) how general action and inaction goals influence information processing, (b) how the unconscious pursuit of information processing goals influences affect toward the goal pursuit process (i.e., decisionmaking process), (c) how this affect can influence postdecision behavioral intentions, and (d) how goal-achieving behaviors influence subsequent goal pursuit.
An activated action or inaction processing goal leads to higher decision process satisfaction in a decision environment that can satisfy the goal (Study 1) because of the extensive or limited processing resulting from goal activation (Study 2). Satisfaction with the decision process leads to higher satisfaction with the decision itself (Study 3) and higher estimated likelihood of performing a decision-congruent behavior (Study 4). The passage of time without an opportunity for goal achievement results in goal escalation and even more positive affect toward the decision process (Study 5). Achievement of one of these goals leads to release of the goal and the pursuit of a competing goal (Study 6).
Affect and Subsequent Goal Pursuit Processes
The influence of achieving a consciously held goal on affect is well known. People will be more satisfied when they are able to achieve a goal than when they are not. People know much less about how decision environments that can be conducive to the pursuit and achievement of unconscious information processing goals influence affect toward the goal pursuit process and how this affect is transferred within the goal system (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski et al., 2002) . This affective transfer suggests that people may be satisfied with their decisions and goal pursuits because of the decision process itself. For example, if an individual is deciding where to go to college, the individual may be highly satisfied with his or her decision independently of what the final decision is, as long as the decision process is conducive to the achievement of an active goal. This implies that providing people with alternatives that are satisfying is not the only way to make people happy with their decisions.
In addition, researchers have long been interested in how to predict people's behaviors on the basis of on their attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1976) . It seems that an additional factor that may predict the likelihood that people will perform behaviors that are congruent with their attitudes is the extent to which the attitude was formed in an environment that allowed for the achievement of an active information processing goal. Even though the generated affect is associated with the goal pursuit process, not with the behavior itself, the presence of positive affect seems to signal to the individual that the behavior should be pursued.
Finally, although previous models have proposed passive goal guidance (e.g., Bargh, 1990 ), these models were built to explain priming effects, not how people manage the pursuit of multiple goals that are important in their lives (Laran, 2009) . My conceptualization and findings provide an account of how the passive goal guidance system balances the pursuit of multiple goals. Shah et al. (2002 Shah et al. ( , p. 1278 stated that the continued inhibition of competing goals during the goal pursuit process may lead to one of two outcomes: The competing goals may be continually inhibited, or they may rebound to high activation levels after the focal goal has been achieved or abandoned. The results of Study 6 suggest a rebound effect. I contend that the rebound effect occurs because of the characteristics of a passive goal guidance system. Although the active, more conscious goal pursuit system searches balance by monitoring the pursuit of multiple goals (e.g., "If I have been indulging in food too much, it is time to have some healthy food"), the passive system does not have the resources necessary for this monitoring process. The passive goal guidance system relies on properties that form the foundation of any cognitive structure, such as the inhibition of semantic information (i.e., concepts) that is unrelated to currently activated information (Anderson, Green, & McCulloch, 2000) . Once the achievement of a goal ceases this inhibition process, previously inhibited information gets reactivated and, in order to trigger goal pursuit, rebounds to high activation levels.
Alternative Explanations
In my studies, positive affect is generated when there is a fit between an activated processing goal and the decision environment. Other areas in decision making have shown the positive effects of fit. For instance, people attribute more value to a chosen object when the decision strategy used (intuition or deliberation) matches a preferred strategy (Betsch & Kunz, 2008) or their current mood (happy or sad; De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008) . People also pay more for products that are chosen with a strategy that fits their regulatory orientation (Avnet & Higgins, 2003) . The research on fit asserts the importance of the current investigation, but these findings cannot explain my results. For example, the mood fit hypothesis (De Vries et al., 2008 ) is interesting and sheds light on how mood influences decision making: people in a good mood prefer to engage in intuitive (vs. deliberate) processing. However, it would need to be argued that a happy mood is activated along with an inaction goal and that satisfaction when the decision process involves processing limited information is actually satisfaction with reliance on one's feelings during the decision-making process. I asked a separate sample of students (N ϭ 72) to indicate their mood on 1 to 9 scales (sad vs. happy, displeased vs. pleased, good vs. bad, disappointed vs. satisfied) after they performed the goal-activating task I used in my experiments. There were no differences among action (M ϭ 5.31), inaction (M ϭ 5.19), and neutral prime participants (M ϭ 5.20; F Ͻ 1). Although mood can play an important role in decision making, my manipulations seem to be orthogonal to people's mood states.
Another explanation for my results is that the priming task may have activated a self-concept. For instance, in Study 6, the activated self-concept may have made participants experience the resting and GRE tasks more intensively, which led to the opposite behavior in the choice task. Self-concept activation may have played a role in my priming procedures, but I believe that goal activation tells a more complete story. For example, the explanation that an activated selfconcept led people to experience the GRE and resting tasks more intensively and thus switch to the opposite behavior cannot explain why this was not the case in the unachieved goal conditions of Study 6. In these conditions, people behaved consistently with the goal because it had not been achieved. A self-concept explanation would need the argument that when any self-concept is activated these tasks are perceived as more intense, independently of the relationship between the tasks and the self-concept. Moreover, affect became stronger in Study 5 after a delay, which is not predicted by conceptualizations of self-concept activation. Finally, I contend that the performances of the tasks in Study 6 (e.g., solving GRE problems) were represented as goal-achieving behaviors in the goal conditions and as simple experimental tasks in the pretest. I expect that a self-concept explanation would predict that after performing a task without previous goal activation (i.e., pretest), the nature of this task could activate an associated self-concept. Participants would show high satisfaction when making a choice from a set congruent with this self-concept, which was not the case based on the patterns of decision satisfaction.
Implications for Information Processing Goal Pursuit
These findings have implications for research in information processing goal pursuit. Processing goals are goals that individuals normally bring consciously to any decision making, such as making an accurate decision, making a quick decision, organizing the options in a meaningful way, comparing similar alternatives, comparing similar attributes, and the like. (Russo et al., 2008) . It seems that the way people process information can be influenced by currently active processing goal concepts and that the most active type of processing goal concept may define the approach that individuals will take when making a decision. Future research is needed to understand which processing goals can be primed and how these primes can influence the decision process (e.g., time, type of information considered) and its outputs (e.g., decisions, behaviors).
This article also offers additional understanding of the emerging research area of general action and inaction goal primes. First, although previous investigation of these goals has primarily focused on their behavioral consequences, I show that these goals may also have a powerful influence on information processing. These goals seem to be often present at some level of activation within the goal system, and subtle cues in the environment may activate one of the goals and determine the amount of information people are willing to process at any given time. This activation process may have important implications for daily processing of information and goal pursuit because the general nature of action and inaction goals have the potential to influence an enormous array of behaviors. Second, it is interesting to observe that participants indicated lower satisfaction with the decision process under high information load when an inaction goal had been primed. They could simply have focused on the most important information content. This result raises the question of whether the passive goal guidance system is as flexible as the active goal guidance system. This is hard to tell from the current results, and it is an interesting area for future research. For instance, the concept of inaction denotes the absence of activity. Nevertheless, my results provide some evidence that little activity can also be used to pursue this goal. When an inaction goal was active and the amount of information in the decision environment was limited, people showed positive affect toward the decision-making process. These results are interesting because they show that people may quickly adapt and adjust the threshold of what a decision environment should offer in order to satisfy an active goal. The results should be seen with caution, however, because they only apply to the specific environments used in this research.
Future Research
Several avenues for future research are warranted. When affect is transferred from the decision-making process to a chosen alternative, is it the case that this affect simply leads to a general tendency to act or is it the case that it leads to a tendency to act specifically toward a decision-congruent behavior? Although an increased tendency to act on a decision implies a decreased tendency to act on the forgone alternatives, it might be the case that unrelated behaviors are also facilitated by this increased affect. Nevertheless, I have reasons to believe that this is not the case and that the affective transfer process is specific. For example, it seems improbable that a primed inaction goal would be followed by a tendency to perform just any behavior as a result of the positive affect toward an environment where this goal can be pursued. In addition, the performance of alternative behaviors would also require the activation of alternative goals, which could only occur in the presence of goal-related information. Future research should shed light on this issue of specificity of affective transfer within the goal system.
The examination of moderators of information processing goal primes is important, given the scarce evidence for moderators of priming effects in general. Past research has been focused on situations in which primes do not work, such as when goal primes generate null effects (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002) , but not on situations in which primes may lead to the pursuit of competing behaviors. I suspect that priming effects are dependent on characteristics of the contexts in which behaviors are executed (e.g., do the contexts enable certain information processing goals and behaviors) or on individual differences (e.g., how much experience does the individual have with pursuing the primed goal or behavior).
Certain cultures are known for having a higher tendency for action and movement, whereas others have a higher tendency for inaction and patience. It is important to examine how these chronic goals can influence processing. It is reasonable to predict that people's chronic tendency for action and inaction will affect decision making in a similar way as situationally priming these goals. The interesting question becomes what happens after goal achievement. Although situationally primed action and inaction goals seem to lead to the pursuit of the opposite goal after goal achievement, in the absence of primes the goal system may simply go back to a resting state after people with a chronic tendency to pursue a given goal achieves the goal.
